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Abstract 
The question asked to interrogate memory has potential to influence response bias 
at retrieval, yet has not been systematically investigated. According to framing 
effects in the field of eyewitness testimony, retrieval cueing effects in cognitive 
psychology and the acquiescence bias in questionnaire responding, the question 
should establish a confirmatory bias. Conversely, according to findings from the 
rewarded decision-making literature involving mixed incentives, the question should 
establish a disconfirmatory bias. Across three experiments (ns = 90 [online], 29 
[laboratory] and 29 [laboratory]) we demonstrate a disconfirmatory bias - "old?" 
decreased old responding. This bias is underpinned by a goal-driven mechanism 
wherein participants seek to maximise emphasised response accuracy at the 
expense of frequency. Moreover, we demonstrate that disconfirmatory biases can be 
generated without explicit reference to the goal state. We conclude that subtle 
aspects of the test environment influence retrieval to a greater extent than has been 
previously considered. 
 
Keywords: episodic memory; recognition; decision-making; evaluation; response 
bias; goal-directed cognition 
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1. Introduction 
Each time we decide whether or not we recognise something in our environment, the 
environment itself informs both why we are attempting to tell old from new, and the 
consequences of making such a decision. When making memory decisions in the 
real world, it is therefore sensible to consider all aspects of our memory decisions, 
from cause to consequence, so as to set appropriate goals that enable more 
strategic use of the available memory evidence. To illustrate this, consider a memory 
user faced with two tasks: the first being to identify a criminal from a suspect line-up; 
the second being to decide whether or not to greet a potential acquaintance at the 
supermarket. If both the suspect and the potential acquaintance evoke equal 
memory evidence in their respective scenarios, it is conceivable that the markedly 
different consequences of incorrect “old” decisions in each situation will lead to 
different memory outcomes. In the line-up the available memory evidence may be 
deemed insufficient to inform the police that the criminal is present, whereas in the 
supermarket, the same level of evidence may be more than enough to greet the 
potential acquaintance. In this way, even subtle manipulations of standard 
recognition testing environments may influence memory evaluations. 
How the testing environment biases memory has been the subject of extensive 
laboratory investigation, which has fuelled the formalisation of the source monitoring 
framework – the collection of monitoring/control processes that underpin the 
evaluation of retrieved memory content (Jacoby, Kelly & McEllrey, 1999; Johnson, 
Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993). For instance, numerous studies have demonstrated 
influences of the testing environment on the likelihood of endorsing false memories, 
as manipulated both in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM; Deese, 
1959; Johnson et al., 1997; Mather, Henkel & Johnson, 1997; Roediger & 
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McDermott, 1995) and in laboratory analogues of eyewitness testimony (Lindsay & 
Johnson, 1989; Loftus, Donders, Hoffman & Schooler, 1989; Loftus, 1996). Testing 
bias effects in the standard single item recognition paradigm have also been 
observed, albeit with a predominant focus on one particular manipulation – cueing. 
Cueing participants that a word presented at test is likely to be old or new has been 
shown to bias decision-making in a confirmatory direction e.g. a “likely old” cue 
increases the likelihood of “old” responding. This effect is consistent across many 
methods of cue delivery, ranging from informing participants of the relative proportion 
of old and new items at test (Ratcliff, Sheu, & Gronlund, 1992; Van Zandt, 2000), 
providing valid and invalid performance feedback (Estes & Maddox, 1995; Han & 
Dobbins, 2009; Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007), and trial-by-trial cueing by text, 
presentation location and colour (Aminoff et al., 2012; Jaeger, Cox, & Dobbins, 2012; 
O'Connor, Han, & Dobbins, 2010; Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007). As long as cues can be 
easily assimilated into the memory decision-making process, they lead to a 
confirmatory bias that increases endorsements of the cued decision (albeit often to a 
lesser degree than would be optimal according to the cue; Cox & Dobbins, 2011; 
Healy & Kubovy, 1978; Wallace, 1980).  
Despite the large volume of research on how explicit cues bias memory, whether 
implicit cues embedded within traditional laboratory-based recognition experiments 
also introduce bias has remained largely overlooked. This is surprising given the 
extensive research in analogous applied domains such as questionnaire design (e.g. 
response acquiescence; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003) and 
eyewitness testimony (e.g. leading questions; Loftus, 1996) in which strong 
influences of question format on decision-making have been observed. These effects 
appear particularly relevant to laboratory-based memory research which often 
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employs the single item recognition paradigm (often termed yes/no recognition) in 
which the question “old?” is presented with a to-be-judged item and is responded to 
with either “yes” or “no” keypresses (e.g. Donaldson, 1996). If this format implicitly 
emphasises the importance of making an “old” decision, and this implicit emphasis 
biases memory performance, then this bias is likely presenting itself in most 
laboratory-based memory research where this canonical “old?”-cued recognition test 
is employed. 
The direction of any bias observed in recognition memory research would provide 
insight into memory decision-making processes that ultimately determine 
responding. Two competing predictions of bias direction are apparent, one derived 
from the laboratory-based memory cueing and applied framing literatures 
summarised above, and an alternative derived from research into rewarded decision-
making. Findings from the cueing/framing literatures suggest that the question “old?” 
sets up an expectation of encountering an old item, thereby leading to a bias towards 
making the emphasised memory decision. A bias in the opposite direction would be 
anticipated from findings in the rewarded decision-making literature. In mixed 
incentive research, increasing both the monetary payoff for a correct response and 
the monetary punishment for an incorrect response, for one of two available 
response options, motivates a bias against making that monetized response (e.g. 
Newman, Widom & Nathan, 1985). To clarify, if the aim was to instantiate similar 
incentives for a single item recognition task, this might involve offering a £1 reward 
for each correct “old” decision, as well as a £1 punishment for each incorrect “old” 
decision, whilst not providing any incentives for correct or incorrect “new” decisions.  
The anticipated effect of this manipulation would be to instil a bias against making an 
“old” decision (as has been observed previously, Han, Huettel, Raposo, Adcock & 
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Dobbins 2010). This reluctance is putatively goal-driven, as participants seek to 
maximise the accuracy of endorsing the decision that is monetarily emphasised as a 
higher-order goal, even if this entails making it less often (e.g. preferring 10 
responses with 90% accuracy to 20 responses with 65% accuracy). If the format of 
the test question serves to impart similar albeit more implicit emphasis to particular 
memory decisions, we would hence expect a different bias direction to the cueing 
hypothesis outlined above: the question “old?” should reduce the likelihood of 
responding “old”, thereby leading to a bias against making the emphasised memory 
decision. 
Below we report three recognition experiments which assess whether the format of 
the test question biases recognition memory responding, and in what direction. We 
used both an established measure (signal detection estimates of response criterion, 
which bin responses by new or old item status) and a somewhat unorthodox 
measure („decision accuracy‟, which bins responses by decision status; Duncan, 
Sadanand & Davachi, 2012) of recognition performance. Across these experiments, 
we replicated a novel form of memory bias sensitive to the decision goals implicitly 
emphasised by the test environment.  
2. Experiment 1 
We first used an online experiment to explore whether bias in yes/no recognition 
memory is influenced by the question presented alongside to-be-judged words at 
test. Following an incidental encoding procedure, the test question was varied on an 
item-by-item basis, between “old?” (old question emphasis condition) and “new?” 
(new question emphasis condition), to which participants could respond “yes” or “no”.  
2.1. Method 
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2.1.1. Participants. Participants were 90 self-reported native English speakers who 
reached the minimum performance threshold of d' > 0.1 in each within-subjects 
experimental condition1 (58 female; mean age = 34.7; age range = 20 to 66), from a 
full sample of 120 completing the online experiment (25 were excluded on the basis 
of being self-reported non-native English speakers2, 5 for poor performance). 
Participants were recruited via links to the experiment posted on the laboratory 
website and social networking sites (i.e. Facebook and Twitter), and were told that 
they would get feedback on their memory performance (i.e. d' and c values) as a 
participation incentive. Informed consent was obtained in accordance with the 
University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee at the University of St 
Andrews. 
2.1.2. Stimuli.  For each participant, a different set of words was randomly sampled 
from a pool of 2199 singular, common nouns from the English Lexicon Project 
(Balota et al., 2007), after the removal of low frequency words (Hyperspace 
Analogue to Language HAL frequency high-pass cut-off: 7.70). This served to 
exclude highly distinctive items, which could lead to extreme variations in memory 
strength and consequently reduce the bias effects of primary interest (final word list 
characteristics: mean HAL frequency = 8.98, mean word length = 7.24, mean 
number of syllables = 2.43). One hundred and twenty words were used in the single 
study-test block administered to participants, with 60 words presented at both study 
and test (old words) and 60 words presented only at test (new words). The 
                                               
1
 This performance threshold was maintained across all three experiments. 
2 
We allowed all website visitors to take part in the study regardless of their self-reported native 
English speaking status. This gave us the option to exclude non-native speakers more reliably than if 
we had gated participation by language status, thereby encouraging misreporting of this demographic 
information amongst those who wished to take part in the study but were actually non-native English 
speakers. 
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experiment was programmed using JavaScript and presented to participants via their 
internet browsers. 
2.1.3. Procedure. Onscreen instructions were followed by a single study-test block. 
During the study phase, participants counted the syllables in each of 60 serially 
presented words. For each self-paced study trial, single words were presented 
above the cue “syllables?” and participants used their mouse to indicate a response 
by pressing a button corresponding to “1” through “6+” (study phase RT M = 2.25s, 
SD = 1.02). A 0.5 s fixation cross preceded each study trial. The test phase 
immediately followed the study phase. A 0.5 s fixation cross preceded each self-
paced test trial (test phase RT M = 2.62s, SD = 0.75), during which the question for 
the upcoming trial was presented: either “old?” or “new?”. The fixation was replaced 
by the to-be-judged word and participants used their mouse to indicate a response 
by pressing one of two onscreen buttons corresponding to “yes” or “no”. Thirty old 
words and 30 new words were presented in each question emphasis condition and 
stimuli were randomly intermixed throughout the test phase (see Fig. 1a). 
2.1.4. Calculation 
Our analyses for all reported experiments were conducted on sensitivity (d′) and 
response bias (c) parameters, derived from assumptions of the equal variance signal 
detection model (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). As in 
Snodgrass and Corwin (1988), a correction for errorless responding was made by 
taking the numbers of hits (Hn; the number of old items correctly judged “old”), 
misses (Mn; the number of old items incorrectly judged “new”), correct rejections 
(CRn; the number of new items correctly judged “new”) and false alarms (FAn; the 
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number of new items incorrectly judged “old”), and calculating adjusted hit (H') and 
false alarm rates (FA') as follows: 
H' = (Hn + 0.5) / (Hn + Mn + 1)     (1) 
FA' = (FAn + 0.5) / (FAn + CRn + 1)    (2) 
These adjusted measures were then used to compute d′ and c: 
d′ = z(H′) – z(FA′),       (3) 
c = -0.5 × [z(H′) + z(FA′)]      (4) 
The signal detection model assumes a continuous normal distribution of memory 
strength and hence the sensitivity and bias parameters could theoretically span an 
infinite range of values. However, in practice d' typically ranges from 0 to 3 (for 
above chance performance) and c ranges from -1 to 1 (with a value of 0 reflecting 
unbiased performance). As highlighted in the introduction, the absolute value of 
criterion on the memory strength continuum in any given recognition test reflects the 
influence of multiple sources of recognition bias. Hence, bias effects specifically 
attributable to the present manipulation of question format were inferred via scrutiny 
of the relative criterion shifts between question conditions in positive or negative 
directions (rather than via interpretation of the absolute criterion values relative to 0 
in each isolated condition). To summarise, larger d' parameters indicate increased 
sensitivity (better discrimination of old from new) and increasingly positive c 
parameters indicate a more conservative bias (reduced tendency towards 
responding “old”).  
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We also conducted more unorthodox analyses of the accuracy of “old” and “new” 
decisions (oldcorr and newcorr respectively). These decision accuracy measures 
represent the proportion correct out of all “old” or “new” decisions made by each 
subject, with responses binned according to “subjective” decision status i.e. the total 
number of “old” or “new” decisions made (which varied across subjects). This is not 
to be confused with the standard Hit and Correct Rejection rates which bin 
responses according to objective “item status” categories i.e. the proportion correct 
out of all old or new items presented in the test list (which remained fixed across 
subjects). As examples of these decision accuracy measures, consider a recognition 
test phase that presents 30 old and 30 new items. If Participant A makes a total of 20 
“old” decisions during their experimental run, with 15 of these decisions being correct 
in identifying old items, this would lead to an oldcorr value of .75 (i.e. 15 correct out of 
a total of 20 “old” decisions). Similarly, if the same participant makes a total of 10 
“new” decisions and 9 of these decisions are correct in identifying new items, this 
would lead to a newcorr value of .90 (i.e. 9 correct out of a total of 10 “new” 
decisions). If Participant B also makes 9 correct “new” decisions but attempts a 
greater overall number of 20 “new” decisions, this would lead to a lower newcorr value 
of .45 (9 correct out of 20 made) – a performance difference with Participant A that 
would be obscured by comparison of Correct Rejection rates alone (which would be 
9 correctly identified new items out of a possible 30 for both participants i.e. .30). The 
decision accuracy measures therefore provide further insight into participants‟ 
subjective experience in making memory decisions under varying question emphasis 
conditions. 
2.2. Results and Discussion 
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2.2.1. Sensitivity and bias. For all experiments, means and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 1. We first established that d' did not differ across question 
emphasis conditions, t(89) = 0.29, p = .771, d = 0.03. Participants‟ sensitivity in 
discriminating old from new words was not influenced by the test question. 
Bias introduced by question emphasis was then assessed by comparing criterion 
placement across the two emphasis conditions, each comprising a test wordlist with 
an equal proportion of old and new items (see Fig. 1b). Estimates of c were 
significantly higher in the old emphasis than the new emphasis condition, t(89) = 
2.141, p = .035, d = 0.23. Participants were biased against endorsing the decision 
emphasised by the question i.e. the question “old?” reduced the likelihood of 
responding “old” relative to the question “new?” Notably the counter-emphasis 
direction of this bias contrasts that observed following cueing manipulations, which 
act to increase endorsement of the cued decision (e.g. O'Connor et al., 2010). 
Rather these findings favour a goal-driven interpretation, wherein the test question 
serves to emphasise one memory decision as a goal and participants are 
consequently more cautious in how they make that emphasised decision. 
2.2.2. Decision accuracy analyses. To further elucidate the mechanisms 
underlying the observed question bias, we also analysed how the accuracy of “old” 
and “new” decisions varied across emphasis conditions (oldcorr and newcorr 
respectively; see Fig. 2a). A 2 (decision type: old or new) x 2 (question emphasis: 
“old?” or “new?”) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on decision accuracy, 
revealing no significant main effects of decision type and question emphasis, both Fs 
< 1. Crucially, the decision type x question emphasis interaction was significant, 
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F(1,89) = 6.07, p = .016, ηp
2 = .064.3 Question emphasis improved the accuracy of 
endorsements of the emphasised decision i.e. “old?” improved the accuracy of “old” 
decisions and “new?” improved the accuracy of “new” decisions (see Table 1 for 
decision accuracy means). Post-hoc comparisons revealed nonsignificant accuracy 
effects in counter-emphasis directions for both “new” and “old” decisions, t(89) = 
1.63, p = .106, d = 0.16 and t(89) = 0.94, p = .348, d = 0.10 respectively (see Fig. 
2a). These findings support the goal-driven interpretation of the observed bias, 
suggesting that the reduction in endorsements of the decision emphasised by the 
question may in fact reflect the instilling of a more stringent monitoring strategy that 
serves to improve the accuracy in making that decision.  
___________________ 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
___________________ 
____________________ 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
____________________ 
____________________ 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
                                               
3
Given the large online sample recruited, we also conducted the same question emphasis analyses 
for d', c and the decision accuracy measures, after the exclusion of participants whose observed 
response bias values were identified as potential outliers. Outliers were searched for on the basis of 
both standard deviation (outliers classified as any response bias value greater than 3 standard 
deviations from the mean) and interquartile range methods (outliers classified as any bias value 
exceeding the upper or lower quartiles by a degree of 1.5 times the interquartile range).  No outliers 
were identified via the first method, and exclusion of one potential outlier via the second method did 
not alter the pattern of results. 
Running Head: QUESTION FORMAT SHIFTS BIAS  13 
____________________ 
3. Experiment 2 
Given the numerically small effects observed in Experiment 1, we first sought to 
replicate these exploratory findings in Experiment 2. We also aimed to follow-up 
observation of the question bias with targeted attempts at clarifying its underlying 
mechanism. We hence repeated the question emphasis manipulation from 
Experiment 1 in a more controlled laboratory setting, albeit with the “old?” and 
“new?” questions varied in block-wise fashion rather than the previously instantiated 
intermixed approach (to ease participants‟ cognitive load during the longer laboratory 
run time). A levels-of-processing (LOP; Craik & Lockhart, 1972) manipulation was 
also incorporated to assess whether the question bias is attenuated under conditions 
of high overall memory strength. Two incidental encoding procedures were 
employed in separate blocks: a deep LOP pleasantness judgement task; and a 
shallow LOP letter case judgement task. To clarify, the case judgement task was 
expected to instil an even lower level of overall memory strength than the syllable-
counting task in Experiment 1 (i.e. expected LOP pleasantness > LOP syllable 
counting > LOP case judgement), and therefore enhance the observed bias. 
Evidence of  bias in shallow but not deep LOP conditions would further indicate that 
the effect is caused by higher order decision strategies whose influence is greater in 
situations of low overall memory strength and associated subjective uncertainty 
(Hirshman, 1995; Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982). 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants. Participants were 29 native English speakers who reached the 
minimum performance threshold (20 female; mean age = 22.1; age range = 19 to 28) 
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from a full sample of 31 completing the experiment (2 were excluded for poor 
performance). Informed consent was obtained in accordance with the University 
Teaching and Research Ethics Committee at the University of St Andrews and all 
participants were compensated for their time at the rate of £5/hr. 
3.1.2. Stimuli. The pool of stimuli from which words were drawn was identical to that 
used in Experiment 1. Each of four study-test blocks utilised 120 words (60 old and 
60 new at each test phase) such that participants were presented with 480 words 
over the course of the experiment. The experiment was presented and responses 
recorded using PCs running MATLAB (The MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA, 2000) and 
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997). 
3.1.3. Procedure. After the presentation of on-screen instructions and a practice 
phase, participants completed four self-paced study-test blocks comprising blocked 
combinations of study LOP (shallow, deep) and test question emphasis (“old?”, 
“new?”). In the two shallow LOP study phases, 60 serially presented words were 
shown in either uppercase or lowercase (50% uppercase) below the prompt 
“uppercase?” and participants used the keyboard to indicate a “yes” or a “no” 
response (shallow LOP RT M = 1.31s, SD = 0.62). In the two deep LOP study 
phases, all words were shown in lowercase and the response prompt was 
“pleasant?” with “yes” and “no” response options (deep LOP RT M = 1.87s, SD = 
0.84). Each test phase, comprising 60 old and 60 new words, immediately followed 
the preceding study phase. In the two old emphasis condition test phases, single 
words were presented below the question “old?”, which was onscreen throughout the 
test block, and participants used the keyboard to give a “yes” or a “no” response (test 
phase RT M = 1.77s, SD = 0.62). After participants rendered their recognition 
Running Head: QUESTION FORMAT SHIFTS BIAS  15 
decision, they received the prompt “confidence?” and provided a “low”, “medium” or 
“high” confidence rating using the keyboard. The only difference in the new 
emphasis condition was that the question “new?” was onscreen throughout the test 
block. A 0.5 s fixation cross preceded each trial across all study and test blocks. The 
confidence assessment for each test trial was preceded by a 0.25 s fixation cross. 
Across participants, the study-test block order was pseudo-randomised such that 
only one level of a factor would change in any block transition. Thus, while it was 
possible for a participant to experience a shallow-“old?” to shallow-“new?” block 
transition, it was not possible for a participant to experience a shallow-“old” to deep-
“new” block transition. Following completion of all four study-test blocks, a short 
battery of standardized cognitive measures was administered - results from the 
battery are not presented here. 
3.2. Results and Discussion 
3.2.1. Sensitivity and bias. To confirm that the LOP manipulation affected memory 
performance as anticipated, a 2 (LOP: shallow or deep) x 2 (question emphasis: 
“old?” or “new?”) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on estimates of d′ (see 
Table 1 for condition means). The ANOVA revealed a main effect of LOP, F(1,28) = 
109.14, p = .001, ηp
2 = .796. As expected, sensitivity was lower in the shallow LOP 
(M = 1.33, SD = 0.73) than the deep LOP condition (M = 2.70, SD = 0.52). There was 
also an unexpected main effect of question emphasis, F(1,28) = 5.84, p = .022, ηp
2 = 
.173, such that d' was higher in the old (M = 2.10, SD = 0.55) than the new emphasis 
condition (M = 1.92, SD = 0.57). There was no significant LOP x emphasis 
interaction, F(1,28) = 1.06, p = .311, ηp
2 = .037. 
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The primary analysis on c was carried out using a 2 (LOP) x 2 (question emphasis) 
repeated measures ANOVA. We found a main effect of question emphasis on c, with 
significantly higher c estimates observed in the old (M = 0.09, SD = 0.24) than the 
new (M = -0.03, SD = 0.32) emphasis condition, F(1,28) = 6.65, p = .015, ηp
2 = .192. 
Although there was no significant interaction effect, F(1,28) = 3.13, p = .088, ηp
2 = 
.101, a numerical trend towards an interaction was observed, and planned pairwise 
comparisons revealed that the question bias achieved statistical significance only in 
the shallow LOP condition, t(28) = 3.05, p = .005, d = 0.62, but not in the deep LOP 
condition, t(28) = .70, p = .487, d = 0.13 (see Figure 1c). These findings replicate the 
bias observed in Experiment 1, and support our prediction of an attenuated bias 
under conditions of high overall memory strength. 
From the same ANOVA on c, we found a main effect of LOP on criterion placement, 
such that c estimates were significantly lower in the deep (M = -0.11, SD = 0.29) 
than the shallow LOP conditions (M = 0.17, SD = 0.30), F(1,28) = 23.66, p = .001, 
ηp
2 = .458. Considered with the prior unexpected effects of emphasis on d′, this 
suggests a complex relationship between higher-order and memory-specific 
processes in the deep LOP condition which may warrant clarification in future 
research4. 
3.2.3. Decision accuracy analyses. As before, we also analysed how the accuracy 
of “old” and “new” decisions was influenced by question emphasis, separately for 
shallow and deep LOP conditions. A 2 (decision type) x 2 (question emphasis) 
repeated measures ANOVA for the shallow LOP conditions revealed a significant 
main effect of decision type, F(1,28) = 9.77, p = .004, ηp
2 = .259 (see Fig, 2b). 
                                               
4
 Eliciting response confidence in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 enabled us to also model unequal 
variance estimates of sensitivity and response bias (Egan, 1975; Ratcliff, Sheu, & Gronlund, 1992), 
for which corroborative effects of question emphasis were observed. 
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Participants‟ “old” decisions were characterised by greater overall accuracy (M = .76, 
SD = .10) than their “new” decisions (M = .71, SD = .09).  Though not of primary 
relevance to our question bias effects, similar disparities in the response profiles of 
“old” and “new” decisions have been reported previously (e.g. Jaeger, Cox & 
Dobbins, 2012). No main effect of question emphasis was observed, F(1,28) = 1.46, 
p = .237, ηp
2 = .050. Crucially however, the decision type x question emphasis 
interaction was significant, F(1,28) = 9.04, p = .006, ηp
2 = .244. This replicated the 
decision accuracy finding from Experiment 1 - question emphasis improved accuracy 
in endorsing the emphasised decision i.e. “old?” improved the accuracy of “old” 
decisions and “new?” improved the accuracy of “new” decisions (see Table 1 for 
decision accuracy means). Post-hoc comparisons revealed a significant difference in 
“old” decision accuracy across question conditions, t(28) = 2.23, p = .034, d = 0.41, 
with a nonsignificant difference obtained for “new” decision accuracy, t(28) = 0.42, p 
= .679, d = 0.07. 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA was also conducted for decision accuracy in the deep LOP 
condition, yielding a nonsignificant main effect of decision type, F(1,28) = 3.80, p = 
.061, ηp
2 = .119, and a significant main effect of question emphasis, F(1,28) = 5.65, p 
= .025, ηp
2 = .168 (see Fig, 2c). Further, the interaction effect was nonsignificant, 
F(1,28) = 1.00, p = .326, ηp
2 = .034. The question “old?” (M = .91, SD = .05) hence 
led to greater decision accuracy than the question “new?” (M = .89, SD = .05), a 
finding supported by the previously presented effect of old emphasis in improving d′ 
in the same deep LOP condition. Collectively, these findings raise the possibility that 
the question “old?” instilled a more rigorous source monitoring strategy that 
prioritised the recovery of recollected content as a basis for responding. In conditions 
of high overall memory strength (as in the deep LOP condition), this directly 
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improved performance, given the higher proportion of recollected old items likely to 
be encountered at test. This contrasts the lack of a main effect of emphasis on 
decision accuracy or d′ in the shallow LOP condition, where old items were less likely 
to be associated with recollected content and hence the adoption of a monitoring 
strategy that exclusively prioritised recollection exerted a less beneficial influence on 
performance.  
To summarise, the observed effects of the test question manipulation support the 
instilment of a goal-driven bias which is particularly prominent under conditions of 
low memory strength. This reflects the heightened influence of an underlying 
strategic process that sets a higher threshold when evaluating diagnostic evidence in 
favour of the decision option emphasised as goal salient. When memory evidence is 
weakly diagnostic overall, this leads to fewer instances of this heightened emphasis 
threshold being surpassed and this served to enhance the counter-emphasis 
behavioural tendency, as indexed by effects on bias and decision accuracy. There 
also appear to be test question-driven effects on memory sensitivity, raising the 
potential for question format to impact directly on the assessment of memory 
evidence. Although not the primary emphasis of this set of experiments, it may be a 
finding which warrants separate investigation. 
4. Experiment 3 
The effects of test question on recognition performance in Experiments 1 and 2 have 
thus far been suggestive of a counter-emphasis bias, wherein one dimension of the 
test environment, the question, implicitly emphasises a particular memory decision 
as a salient goal and leads to reduced endorsement of that decision. However, in 
both experiments, the observed bias effect could alternatively reflect a tendency to 
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respond “no”, irrespective of the presented question and the implicitly emphasised 
decision goals (see Fig. 3b).  
To adjudicate between these interpretations, we independently manipulated question 
format (similar to emphasis in Experiments 1 and 2) and response format. The 
response format manipulation was effectuated by providing only one response option 
at test, with the alternative response indicated by withholding from using that 
response option. This is similar to laboratory-based go/no go procedures (e.g. Bruin 
& Wijers, 2002) and applied eye-witness identification procedures where participants 
are given the option of not-responding in perpetrator-free line-ups (e.g. Weber & 
Perfect, 2012) Across study-test blocks, this single response option denoted either a 
"yes" or a "no" response, and was varied independently of question format. This 
allowed us to test whether bias shifts according to the decision emphasised as a 
goal by the combination of the question and response formats, or whether it followed 
the decision which maps onto a "no" response irrespective of emphasis (see Fig. 
3b).  
____________________ 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
____________________ 
____________________ 
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
____________________ 
4.1. Method 
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4.1.1. Participants. Participants were 29 native English speakers who reached the 
minimum performance threshold (21 female; mean age = 20.6; age range = 18 to 25) 
from a full sample of 35 completing the experiment (4 were excluded for failing to 
understand task instructions, 2 for poor task performance). Informed consent and 
compensation procedures were identical to those in Experiment 2.  
4.1.2. Stimuli. The pool of stimuli from which words were drawn was identical to that 
used in Experiments 1 and 2. Each of five study-test blocks utilised 120 words (60 
old and 60 new at each test phase) such that participants were presented with 600 
words over the course of the study. The experiment was presented and responses 
recorded using PCs running MATLAB and Psychophysics Toolbox. 
4.1.3. Procedure. After the presentation of on-screen instructions and a practice 
phase, participants completed five study-test blocks. All study phases employed a 
self-paced case judgement task presented and responded to in a manner identical to 
that described for Experiment 2 (study phase RT M = 1.09s, SD = 0.58), and were 
immediately followed by test phases comprising 60 old words and 60 new words. 
The first test phase comprised a recognition test with neutral emphasis (no single 
decision was emphasised by the question or response format) and was used to 
calibrate the response window in which recognition decisions could be made in 
subsequent test phases. In this calibration test phase, to-be-judged words were 
presented below the question “old/new?”, and participants used the keyboard to give 
an “old” or a “new” response. Following each recognition decision, participants 
received the prompt “confidence?” and provided a confidence rating of “low”, 
“medium” or “high”. Both responses were self-paced. The response window for 
recognition decisions in subsequent test phases was set, on a participant-by-
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participant basis, as the 80th percentile of the slowest category of recognition 
decisions broken down by confidence (typically “low” confidence decisions). This 
response window ensured that participants had sufficient time to make paced 
recognition decisions in subsequent test phases (M = 3.84 s, SD = 1.69). 
The next four test phases comprised blocked combinations of question format (“old?” 
or “new?”) and response format (“yes” keypress or “no” keypress; see Fig. 3a). 
Question format was manipulated across blocks as described for Experiment 2. 
Response format was manipulated across blocks by allocating either “yes” or “no” to 
a single keyboard response. Participants submitted the allocated response with a 
keypress or endorsed the opposing response by withholding the keypress for the 
duration of the paced trial. To prevent preferential keypress responding to hasten 
completion of the task, the second stage of responding was initiated after the full 
response window had elapsed, irrespective of whether a keypress was made or 
withheld. Subsequently, participants received the prompt “confidence?” and provided 
a self-paced confidence rating of “low”, “medium” or “high”. Participants could 
alternatively make a “discard” response if they wanted their previous recognition 
decision to be ignored. This option was intended for when participants had failed to 
render a response due to an attentional lapse and prevented such trials from being 
coded as deliberately withheld responses. A 0.5 s fixation cross preceded each 
recognition assessment and a 0.25 s fixation cross preceded each confidence 
assessment. 
Across the four study-test blocks, participants completed two test phases with an old 
decision emphasis (“old?”-“yes” and “new?”-“no”), and two test phases with a new 
decision emphasis (“old?”-“no” and “new?”-“yes”). The four tests were presented in a 
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pseudorandomised order that minimised the combined switching of question and 
response formats across study-test blocks. 
4.2. Results and Discussion 
4.2.1. Sensitivity and bias. A 2 (response format: “yes” keypress or “no” keypress) 
x 2 (question format: “old?” or “new?”) repeated measures ANOVA on estimates of d′ 
revealed no significant main or interaction effects, all Fs < 1. As expected, sensitivity 
was unaffected by the test format manipulations. 
For the main analysis, a 2 (response format) x 2 (question format) repeated 
measures ANOVA on response criterion c found no main effects of response or 
question format, F(1,28) = 3.73, p = .064, ηp
2 = .117 and F < 1 respectively. 
Crucially, the interaction of response format and question format was significant, 
F(1,28) = 8.50, p = .007, ηp
2 = .233 (see Table 1 for means). Planned pairwise 
comparisons revealed significant increases in c (i.e. a shift towards conservative 
“old” responding) when old was emphasised by the combination of response and 
question formats (see Fig. 3c). For the “yes” response format, c was placed higher 
for “old?” than “new?” questions, t(28) = 2.41, p = .023, d = 0.45. For the “no” 
response format, c was lower for “old?” than “new?” questions, t(28) = 2.77, p = .010, 
d = 0.52. Note that in the “no” response format condition, old emphasis is imparted 
by a “new?” question and new emphasis is imparted by an “old?” question (see Fig. 
3a for further details). These findings replicate the biases observed in Experiments 1 
and 2, and suggest that the effect is indeed driven by which decision is emphasised 
as a goal, and not by a general tendency to respond “no”.  
4.2.3. Decision accuracy analyses. We also analysed how the accuracy of “old” 
and “new” decisions was influenced by question emphasis, which are presented 
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separately for each response format condition. A 2 (decision type) x 2 (question 
format) repeated measures ANOVA for the “yes” response condition yielded no 
significant effects of decision type, F(1,28) = 1.98, p = .171, ηp
2 = .066, and question 
format, F < 1. Importantly, the decision type x question format interaction was 
significant, F(1,28) = 14.19, p = .001, ηp
2 = .336, with “old?” improving the accuracy 
of “old” decisions and “new?” improving the accuracy of “new” decisions (see Fig. 4a; 
see Table 1 for means). Post-hoc comparisons revealed a numerical difference 
approaching significance in “old” decision accuracy across question conditions, t(28) 
= 2.01, p = .054, d = 0.37, with a nonsignificant difference in the same emphasis-
consistent direction obtained for “new” decision accuracy, t(28) = 0.48, p = .637, d = 
0.09. 
A 2 (decision type) x 2 (question format) repeated measures ANOVA for the “no” 
response condition yielded no significant main effects of decision type and question 
format, both Fs < 1. Crucially, the decision type x question format interaction was 
significant, F(1,28) = 14.19, p = .001, ηp
2 = .336, with “new?” improving the accuracy 
of “old” decisions and “old?” improving the accuracy of “new” decisions (as 
mentioned before, this bias is in a goal-driven direction, given the inverse emphasis 
imparted by the question in the “no” response condition; see Fig. 4b). Post-hoc 
comparisons revealed an emphasis-consistent trend approaching significance for 
new decision accuracy across question conditions, t(28) = 2.04, p = .051, d = 0.39, 
with a nonsignificant effect in the same emphasis-driven direction obtained for old 
decision accuracy, t(28) = 1.12, p = .271, d = 0.21. The decision accuracy findings 
from Experiments 1 and 2 were hence replicated in both response format conditions 
- question emphasis improved the accuracy of endorsing the emphasised decision. 
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5. General Discussion 
Across three recognition experiments, the format of the test question acted as a 
consistent source of bias in memory decision-making. Experiment 1 recruited a large 
online sample and provided some preliminary evidence of bias effects introduced by 
the test question typically presented in recognition research. Experiment 2 
effectuated a more targeted laboratory follow-up to these exploratory findings, by 
demonstrating that the question bias is most prominent under conditions of low 
memory strength. Experiment 3 tested two competing explanations for the bias, 
finding evidence that it was driven by a goal-driven mechanism rather than a 
preference for “no” responses. In all three experiments, we replicated the novel 
finding of a counter-emphasis bias – a decrease in endorsement of the memory 
decision emphasised by the memory test itself. Our analyses involving the more 
unorthodox decision accuracy measures also recovered a consistent effect of 
question emphasis improving the accuracy of endorsements of the emphasised 
decision. Considered with the response bias effects, the pattern of results suggests 
that the counter-emphasis serves to improve the accuracy of making emphasised 
responses, at the expense of their frequency. We now discuss these results in light 
of previous findings in the fields of memory and decision-making. 
Prior studies observing effects of test format on memory performance have often 
employed recognition paradigms primarily tailored for the study of false memories, 
such as the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM; Deese, 1959; Johnson et 
al., 1997; Mather, Henkel & Johnson, 1997; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Further, 
those studies that have investigated effects of test format in the standard single item 
recognition paradigm have typically focused on measures of source memory or 
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subjective experiences of memory (Bastin & Van der Linden, 2003; Dodson & 
Johnson, 1993; Hicks & Marsh, 1999; Khoe, Kroll, Yonelinas, Dobbins, & Knight, 
2000; Marsh & Hicks, 1998). For example, Hicks and Marsh (1999) reported an 
increase in “old” responding in a recognition test phase comprising three response 
options with two “old” subcategories (“remember old”/“know old”/“new”) compared to 
a test phase with two equally weighted response options (“old”/“new”, followed by 
“remember”/“know”; though cf. Bruno & Rutherford, 2010). Here we present 
evidence of a test format bias in the primary measure of recognition performance, 
which manifests in the absence of unequally weighted response options. 
Nevertheless, our findings coalesce with previously reported test format biases in 
false memory and source memory paradigms, in highlighting the salient influence of 
monitoring and control processes in constraining the outcomes of memory 
evaluations (Johnson et al., 1993; Jacoby et al., 1999). 
Further, the observed bias was in the opposite direction to previously reported test 
format biases, such as the acquiescence bias in questionnaire responding 
(Podsakoff, et al., 2003), the Loftus framing effect (Loftus, 1996) and decision cueing 
in recognition research (e.g. Egan, 1958; O'Connor, et al., 2010; Ratcliff, et al., 1992; 
Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007). We suggest that our counter-emphasis bias differs from 
cue-driven biases in that it establishes a decision goal against which retrieved 
memory evidence is evaluated, rather than contributing to the evidence itself. This 
aspect also differentiates the present question effects from the classic Loftus framing 
effect, in which questions that framed details of potentially encoded contexts 
(“leading questions”) led to a confirmatory response tendency that enhanced 
fallacious endorsement of contexts as having been previously experienced (Loftus, 
1996). Our questions lacked any such allusion to explicit aspects of encoding, which 
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would putatively impact upon memory decision-making by directly interfering with the 
assessment of memory evidence. Rather, our question manipulations impacted via a 
more meta-memorial pathway, by implicitly emphasising a particular memory 
decision as a higher order goal, the endorsement of which demanded a higher level 
of memory evidence relative to the non-emphasised decision.  Our findings therefore 
inform a tentative distinction between three major strategic biases wrought by 
different aspects of the retrieval environment on memory decision-making: decision 
cueing (confirmatory), evidence framing (confirmatory) and goal emphasis 
(disconfirmatory). Future research will be needed to corroborate this distinction. 
The present effects hence reveal a strategic influence on conscious memory use 
consistent with findings in the rewarded decision-making literature, particularly mixed 
incentive research. In mixed incentive research, monetising one of two available 
response options leads to a reluctance to endorse the monetised decision (Newman 
et al., 1985). A similar disconfirmatory bias was reported in a prior recognition 
experiment that differentially provided mixed incentives for “old” or “new” decisions 
(Han et al., 2010). The present findings are notable for inducing comparable caution 
without the provision of incentives, and demonstrate that even in the absence of any 
explicit mention of reward, participants display a goal-directed bias that is driven by 
implicit information gleaned from the testing environment. Future research is 
necessary to test the correspondence of the present question emphasis effects with 
more explicit emphasis mechanisms involving incentives. 
We also found evidence that the counter-emphasis bias, whilst decreasing the 
frequency of the emphasised decision, improved the accuracy of these decisions 
when they were made. Most manipulations enacted solely at retrieval have little or 
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no impact on old/new discrimination sensitivity, which is largely determined by 
encoding processes (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Stretch & Wixted, 1998; albeit with 
some exceptions; Dobbins & McCarthy, 2008; Marsh & Hicks, 1998). Indeed, across 
all three experiments our retrieval manipulations had little effect on measures of d′ 
sensitivity that binned responses by „objective‟ item categories and collapsed across 
old and new decisions. However, the reported effects on decision accuracy (oldcorr 
and newcorr; measures that binned responses by „subjective‟ decision categories) 
highlight the efficacy of these more unorthodox analyses in elucidating a strategic 
effect which would otherwise be obscured by standard d' sensitivity analysis. 
Analogous influences of the test environment on the strategies adopted in monitoring 
retrieved memory evidence have been highlighted previously in the study of source 
monitoring and false memories (Johnson et al., 1997; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; 
Mather et al., 1997). In the present context, it furthers our suggestion of a goal-
directed mechanism underlying the counter-emphasis bias, in that participants were 
seemingly prompted by the question to adjust their response criterion towards a 
more rigorous evaluation of the retrieved memory evidence supporting the 
emphasised decision. The question therefore served to instil the goal of getting a 
greater proportion of the emphasised decisions correct, even if that entailed making 
fewer endorsements of that decision.  
Whilst the counter-emphasis bias was reliably elicited across three experiments, 
further research is undoubtedly necessary to corroborate our interpretations of its 
underlying mechanism. Beyond the highlighted need to test both the proposed 
differentiation of retrieval format biases and the correspondence between implicit 
and explicit forms of goal emphasis, future research might also seek to clarify 
whether old and new items are differentially biased by goal emphasis mechanisms 
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(as has been recently suggested e.g. Kafkas & Montaldi, 2014), as well as the 
potential mediating role of individual differences in bias tendency (Aminoff et al., 
2012; Kantner & Lindsay, 2012). Another intriguing avenue for future research could 
examine participants‟ awareness of the variations in question emphasis, and how 
manipulating this awareness (e.g. by dividing attention at test) impacts on the 
evoked bias. Nonetheless, the reliable effect of question format on recognition bias 
presented here reflects the role that subtle aspects of the test environment can have 
on the precise quantification of established memory measures. Importantly for 
laboratory-based memory research, we show that the canonical yes-no memory 
experiment itself provides a source of bias which has hitherto received scant 
systematic investigation.  
As with many psychological phenomena, it is useful to think of the findings reported 
here as functional or adaptive when placed in the context of the real world in which 
we make almost all of our memory decisions. An eyewitness confronted with a line-
up of potential suspects is cautious of making an “old” decision as this initiates an 
action sequence that might end with the prosecution of the identified individual; the 
alternate “new” decision is comparatively less consequential, as no conclusive step 
is taken to end the ongoing suspect search. Alternatively, a guard tasked with 
ensuring security at restricted event may be cautious about making a “new” decision, 
as this initiates apprehension of the identified individual, whereas rendering the 
alternate “old” decision maintains the status quo. In sum, the present findings add to 
emerging research highlighting the close coupling of memory and environmental 
factors which may be the reason the evaluation is being made in the first place. 
Above all, it is necessary to remember that memory function, like any cognitive 
function, can only be isolated from the environment in which it is carried out with 
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great difficulty. Even when we believe we have this isolation, the inferences our 
participants make which carry over from their adaptive use in hundreds of day-to-
decisions, may have pervasive and unexpected influences which it is important to 
investigate and understand.  
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Tables 
Table 1.  
 
Note: M, mean; SD, standard deviation.
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
Encoding 
task 
syllables case pleasantness case 
Question 
format 
old new old new old new old new old new 
Response 
format 
- - - - - - yes yes no no 
Emphasis old new old new old new old new new old 
H M .77 .79 .64 .70 .92 .91 .69 .72 .74 .68 
 SD .15 .12 .17 .13 .08 .08 .13 .15 .14 .14 
CR M .81 .79 .81 .74 .89 .86 .75 .71 .69 .73 
 SD .10 .12 .12 .15 .08 .09 .13 .16 .16 .15 
d′ M 1.71 1.73 1.37 1.28 2.83 2.57 1.26 1.28 1.26 1.18 
 SD 0.61 0.58 0.70 0.87 0.63 0.54 0.55 0.82 0.80 0.66 
c M 0.06 -0.00 0.26 0.07 -0.09 -0.13 0.12 0.00 -0.07 0.08 
 SD 0.36 0.37 0.41 0.26 0.34 0.32 0.38 0.34 0.30 0.35 
oldcorr M .81 .80 .78 .73 .90 .87 .74 .71 .70 .72 
 SD .09 .10 .11 .12 .07 .07 .11 .12 .12 .12 
newcorr M .79 .80 .71 .71 .92 .91 .70 .71 .72 .68 
 SD .10 .09 .10 .11 .07 .07 .08 .10 .12 .10 
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Figure 2. 
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Figure 3. 
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Captions 
 
Table 1. Design key and descriptive statistics for unadjusted hit rate (H), unadjusted 
correct rejection rate (CR), sensitivity (d′), response bias (c), “old” decision accuracy 
(oldcorr) and “new” decision accuracy (newcorr), as observed across all experiments. 
 
Figure 1. a) Design schematic for Experiment 1 showing study and test phases. b) 
Experiment 1 results for response criterion (c) across question emphasis conditions. 
c) Experiment 2 results for c across question emphasis conditions, with separate 
lines denoting LOP condition. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
Figure 2.  Results of the accuracy by decision type analyses for: a) Experiment 1, b) 
the Experiment 2 shallow LOP condition and c) the Experiment 2 deep LOP 
condition. Separate lines denote decision type (“old” or “new”; responses binned by 
decision status) and error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
 
Figure 3. a) Design schematic for Experiment 3 test phase. Within each 120-trial test 
block, participants responded to words presented alongside a question (either “old?” 
or “new?”; varied blockwise) by endorsing or withholding a single response (either 
“yes” or “no”; varied blockwise). The response window for endorsing or withholding 
recognition responses was equated, and calibrated on a participant-by-participant 
basis. After each recognition response, confidence was assessed on a three-point 
scale, with an additional “discard” option allowing participants to discard missed 
responses. b) Schematic representation of criterion placement (c) as generated by 
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competing bias predictions for Experiment 3. Arrows denote deviations from optimal 
criterion placement at 0, with increasing c associated with decreased “old” 
responding („conservative‟ “old” responding) and decreasing c associated with 
increased “old” responding („liberal‟ “old” responding). According to the “no” 
attraction prediction, participants consistently prefer responding “no”, and hence c 
should decrease when an “old” decision maps to the “no” response option (“new?”-
“yes” and “new?”-“no” test blocks), and increase when it maps to the „yes‟ response 
option (“old?”-“yes” and “old?”-“no” test blocks). According to the counter-emphasis 
prediction, the combination of the question and response formats serves to 
emphasise one class of decision, and participants decrease endorsement of that 
decision. Hence, c should increase when “old” decisions are emphasised (“old?”-
“yes” and “new?”-“no” test blocks) and decrease when “new” decisions are 
emphasised (“new?”-“yes” and “old?”-“no” test blocks). c) Experiment 3 results for c 
across question format conditions, grouped by response format conditions. Error 
bars represent standard error of the mean.  
 
Figure 4. Results of the accuracy by decision type analyses for the two response 
format conditions in Experiment 3: a) “Yes” response condition and b) “No” response 
condition. Note that in the „no‟ response condition, emphasis is reversed i.e. “old?”-
“no” emphasises “new” decisions and “new?”-“no” emphasises “old” decisions. 
Separate lines denote decision type (old” or “new”; responses binned by decision 
status) and error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
